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PARTNERSHIP ALLOCATIONS*
DONALD J. WEIDNER
I. Introduction
The basic rules of partnership allocations can be stated simply.
In general, partners are free to determine in their partnership agree-
ment how the various economic and tax consequences of partner-
ship operations will be allocated.' The partnership agreement
includes any amendments made up until the time for filing .the
partnership return.2 Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 3 allo-
cations in the partnership agreement were respected unless they
were for the "principal purpose" of tax avoidance or evasion.4
AlloCations that violated the principal purpose limitation were dis-
regarded and reallocated according to the partners' ratio for sharing
the "taxable income or loss of the partnership, as described in
section 702(a)(9)." 5 The 1976 Act makes several changes in the pro-
visions governing partnership allocations; most basically, it removes
the provisions just quoted. It replaces the "principal purpose"
limitation with the requirement that allocations have "substantial
economic effect."6 Allocations that lack substantial economic effect
will be reallocated according to each partner's "interest in the part-
nership (determined by taking into account all facts and circum-
stances)." 7 An examination of prior law will make clear that the
1976 Act makes little, if any, change in the law of partnership
allocations. Prior authority, therefore, retains its vitality, and it con-
tinues to be important to understand how the Service and the
courts have applied the principal purpose limitation.
I. Prior to the Tax Reform Act
A. The Orrisch Case.
The most striking aspect of the principal purpose limitation is
that it is an extremely undeveloped concept. There is relatively
little authority to explain its precise application in the wide variety
* This paper is adapted from Weidner, Partnership Allocations and Tax Reform,
5 Fla. St. L. Rev. I (1977), and appears here courtesy of The Florida State University
Law Review.
I Int. Rev. Code of 1954, as amended immediately prior to the passage of the Tax
Reform Act of 1976, § 704(a) [hereinafter "Code"]. Unless otherwise indicated herein,
the Code partnership provisions under discussion are not changed by the Tax Reform
Act of 1976.
2 Code§ 76 1(c).
3 The Tax Reform Act of 1976, H.R. 10612, Pub. L. No. 94-455 [hereinafter some-
times referred to as the "1976 Act"].
4 Code § 704(b)(2).
5 Code § 704(b).
1976 Act § 213(d), amending Code §§ 704 (a) and (b), effective for taxable years
of the partnership beginning after December 31, 1975.
7Id.
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of situations in which it can be called into play. The difficulty
it has presented to practitioners has been compounded by the re-
fusal of the Service to issue advance rulings on whether it will
be satisfied in a proposed transaction.8 The legislative history of
the provision indicates little more than that partners were to have
substantial leeway to determine allocations among themselves and
that they were to be permitted to share income in a different
manner than they share in losses.9 Perhaps the most frequently
quoted indication of legislative intent is the language in the
Senate Finance Committee Report that explained the principal
purpose limitation as follows:
Where, however, a provision in a partnership agreement
for a special allocation of certain items has a substantial
economic effect and is not merely a device for reducing
the taxes of certain partners without actually affecting
their shares of partnership income, then such a provi-
sion will be recognized for tax purposes.10
The Regulations state that an allocation must be considered
"in relation to all the surrounding facts and circumstances" to
determine whether the principal purpose limitation has been vio-
lated, and list several factors to be considered. Perhaps because
of the Senate Report language just quoted, there appears to have
emerged a general sentiment that the most important of the factors
identified in the Regulations is "whether the allocation has 'sub-
stantial economic effect', that is, whether the allocation may actually
affect the dollar amount of the partners' shares of the total partner-
ship income or loss independently of tax consequences."" Surpris-
ingly little attention has been given to the admonition in the Regula-
8 Rev. Proc. 74-22, 1974-2 Cum. Bull. 476.
9 Both the House and Senate Reports contain the following statement:
In the case of a partnership where there is a different ratio for sharing income
than that applicable for sharing losses, the income ratio shall be applicable
if the partnership has taxable income in the partnership taxable year, and
the loss ratio shall be applicable in any year in which the partnership has a
loss.
H. R. Rep. No. 1337, 223 and S.Rep. No. 1622, 379, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., (1954), (to
accompany H.R. 8300, Pub. L. No. 591).
10 S. Rep. No. 1622 at 379.
I The Regulations state the following are among the relevant circumstances in deter-
mining whether the principal purpose of an allocation in a partnership agreement is for
the avoidance or evasion of federal income tax:
Whether the partnership or a partner individually has a business purpose for
the allocation; whether the allocation has "substantial economic effect" that
is, whether the allocation may actually affect the dollar amount of the part-
ners' shares of the total partnership income or loss independently of tax con-
sequences; whether related items of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit
from the same source are subject to the same allocation; whether the alloca-
tion was made without recognition of normal business factors and only after
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tions to consider whether "the partnership or a partner individually
has a business purpose for the allocation" and whether "related items
of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit from the same source are
subject to the same allocation."12
Perhaps because of the preoccupation with "substantial econo-
mic effect," practitioners frequently assume that the principal
purpose limitation is satisfied if the allocation in question bears
some immediate relation to any economic dimension of the part-
nership. Whether this is or will remain the truth is the subject of
my presentation today. What I would like to address at the outset
is the unfortunate tendency to assume that an allocation will
have some economic effect if it has impact on the partnership's
capital accounts. Such a notion should not have survived Stanley
C. Orrisch,13 the leading case on partnership allocations. Orrisch
illustrates one critical point that cannot be overemphasized: a
partnership's capital accounts may have no economic significance.14
Orrisch involved two husband and wife couples, the Orrisches
and the Crisafis, who in 1963 entered into a partnership in which
everything was to be divided on a 50-50 basis. The Orrisches
contributed $26,500 in cash and the Crisafis contributed $12,500
in cash and the partnership purchased two apartment houses that
were paid for almost entirely with borrowed funds. In 1966 the
Crisafis, who had substantial tax losses from other sources and
had not reported taxable income at any time during the life of
the partnership, orally agreed that for 1966 and subsequent years
all of the depreciation deductions of the partnership would be allo-
cated to the Orrisches, who were in need of tax losses. The
the amount of the specially allocated item could reasonably be estimated;
the duration of the allocation; and the overall tax consequences of the alloca-
tions.
Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(1964).
The examples in the Regulations that illustrate the application of these tests indicate
that an allocation will not be disregarded simply because it results in a tax savings to
all partners. On the other hand, the fact the parties would not have entered a trans-
action without a particular allocation does not mean it will be found to have substantial
economic effect apart from tax consequences. The tests are best viewed as interrelated
avenues of inquiry to determine all of the economic consequences of a particular alloca-
tion.
12 Id.
13 55 T.C. 395 (1970), affd per curiam, 73-556, 31 P-H Am. Fed. Tax Rep. 1069 (9th
Cir. 1973).
14 Nor does a partner's capital account necessarily reflect his basis in his partnership
interest. SeeTreas. Reg. § 1.705-1(a)(1)(1956):
The adjusted basis of a partner's interest in a partnership is determined with-
out regard to any amount shown in the partnership books as the partner's
"capital", "equity", or similar account. For example, A contributes property
with an adjusted basis to him of $400 (and a value of $1,000) to a partnership.
B contributes $1,000 cash. While under their agreement each may have a
"capital account" in the partnership of $1,000, the adjusted basis of A's in-
terest is only $400 and B's interest, $1,000.
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Orrisches' capital account was lowered by the amount of the depre-
ciation deductions allocated to them, with the result that their
capital account was reduced far below that of the Crisafis.
The court found that the Orrisches had agreed to pay tax on
any gain that might occur on the sale of partnership property to
the extent they had been specially allocated what otherwise would
have been the Crisafis' half of the depreciation deductions. However,
the court also found that the charges of depreciation against the
Orrisches' capital account had no economic significance. Operating
profits and losses, computed without regard to depreciation, con-
tinued to be divided equally. Similarly, the proceeds of any sale
of partnership property would still be divided equally. Under normal
accounting principles, the court said, the disparity in capital accounts
caused by the special allocation of depreciation would be treated as
a debt to the partnership or would affect the division of proceeds
in the event of sale of the partnership assets. However, it found
no indication that the parties intended normal accounting princi-
ples to control the significance of their capital accounts. No debt
was intended and the proceeds of any sale of partnership property
would continue to be divided equally. 5 In short, the only signi-
ficance of the charge of specially allocated depreciation against
the Orrisches' capital account was that it reflected the extent
to which the Orrisches would absorb the Crisafis' tax bill in the
event the property were sold at a gain.
It is therefore clear that the special allocation of depreciation
failed, in the words of the Regulations, to "actually affect the
dollar amount of the partners' shares of the total partnership
income and loss independently of tax consequences." However, the
court went beyond a recitation of the tests in the Regulations and
attempted to clarify the basic meaning of the principal purpose
limitation. It explained the "substantial economic effect" language in
the Senate Report as follows:
This reference to "substantial economic effect" did not
appear in the House Ways and Means Committee report
15 Orrisch is strikingly similar to Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2), Example (1)(1964):
Example (1). The provisions of a partnership agreement for a year in
which the partnership incurs losses on the sale of depreciable property used
in the trade or business are amended to allocate such losses to one partner
who has no such gains individually. An equivalent amount of partnership
loss or deduction of a different character is allocated to other partners who
individually have gains from the sale of depreciable property used in the
trade or business. Since the purpose and effect of this allocation is solely to
reduce the taxes of certain partners without actually affecting their shares
of partnership income, such allocation will not be recognized.
The only major difference is that the Crisafis did not immediately receive deductions
of a different character (they did not appear to need deductions of any character for the
years in question), but were to be relieved of tax burden on the sale of the property at a
gain to the extent the Orrisches had been specially allocated depreciation.
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• . . and was apparently added in the Senate Finance Com-
mittee to allay fears that special allocations of income or
deductions would be denied effect in every case where
the allocation resulted in a reduction in the income tax
liabilities of one or more of the partners. The statement
is an affirmation that special allocations are ordinarily
to be recognized if they have a business validity apart
from their tax consequences.16
The court said the special allocation to the Orrisches "was adopted
for a tax avoidance rather than a business purpose" and "did not
reflect normal business considerations but was designed primarily
to minimize the overall tax liabilities of the partners." 7 The
depreciation was therefore reallocated according to "taxable income
or loss of the partnership, as described in section 702(a)(9),"
that is, according to the partners' 50-50 ratio for sharing general
profits or losses.'s
The court's emphasis on business purpose is somewhat clouded
because of its roundabout response to the Orrisches' assertion
that the purpose of the special allocation of depreciation was to
compensate them for their greater economic investment in the
enterprise. The court stated that the evidence did not support
the "contention" that the special allocation had been adopted "in
order to equalize the capital accounts of the partners." Its reasoning
was simple: equalization of capital accounts could not have been
the goal because the special allocation of depreciation sent the
capital account of the Orrisches further below the capital account
of the Crisafis than it previously had been above it. The court's
discussion of the increased disparity in capital accounts is confusing
because the Orrisches did not argue that their goal was to equal-
ize capital accounts per se.19 Their argument was one that would
have to be refuted by something more than simple subtraction.
16 55 T.C. at 400-01 (citations omitted).
SId. at 401.
I' The application of the reallocation mechanism is slightly more complicated in the
case of certain "bottom-line" allocations. See infra, text accompanying notes 65 to 75.
19 The capital accounts in Orrisch did not accurately reflect current economic invest-
ment in the partnership, nor did they accurately reflect tax basis, nor were they the ba-
sis for any allocation ratios. They reflected all cash contributions, withdrawals and dis-
tributions, all items of partnership taxable income and loss, but did not include part-
ners' shares of partnership liabilities. There is no uniform rule on the composition of
capital accounts, and the computation used in Orrisch is not uncommon, particularly
among partnerships that have no allocation ratios based on capital accounts. Such a
computation produces a figure that does not reflect accurately tax basis because the
partners' shared of partnership liabilities are not included. Actual economic investment
is not reflected because tax losses are deducted. For example, under the Orrisch system,
if partner A were to contribute $100 additional cash to the partnership, his capital ac-
count would be increased by $100, as would his actual economic investment in the en-
terprise. If he were then to receive a -pass-through" of $100 of partnership tax losses
his capital account would be lowered by $100, not merely by the actual dollar amount
TAX CONFERENCE
Recall that the Orrisches had initially contributed twice the amount
of cash that had been contributed by the Crisafis. The Orrisches'
real argument was that the special allocation of depreciation was
an attempt to equalize the capital investments of the partners,
not their capital accounts.20 The two are not necessarily the same.
Capital accounts often involve a strange mixture of apples and
oranges, at least from an investor's point of view. Consider, for
example, the taxpayer in the 50 percent bracket who contributes
$100 in cash and receives in return a $100 credit on his capital
account. If he subsequently is allocated a $100 depreciation deduc-
tion, his capital account (at least under the system used in Orrisch),
is reduced to zero. But he would not consider that his entire capital
investment has been returned to him. Rather, he would consider
that his investment has been returned only to the extent of the $50
savings on his tax bill that resulted from the depreciation deduc-
tion. So, too, with the Orrisches. Although their capital account was
lowered by the full amount of depreciation allocated to them,
their cash investment was returned in only a fraction of that amount,
depending on their tax bracket. Indeed, the total amount of depre-
ciation specially allocated to the Orrisches in the years in question
would not have been sufficient to return them their excess capital
investment had they been in the 50 percent bracket. Therefore, the
increased disparity in capital accounts did not negate an intention to
equalize economic investment, and the question remained whether
the approach adopted was permissible.
The court directly addressed this issue in a footnote that indi-
cated its appreciation of the fact that the capital accounts in
Orrisch did not accurately reflect the economic investment of the
partners:
We recognize that petitioners had more money invested
in the partnership than the Crisafis and that it is reason-
able for the partners to endeavor to equalize their invest-
ments, since each one was to share equally in the profits
and losses of the enterprise. However, we do not think
that sec. 704(a) permits the partners' prospective tax
benefits to be used as the medium for equalizing their
the loss would save him on his tax bill, which is the true measure of the reduction of
his actual economic investment in the partnership. Therefore, the Orrisches had no
reason to equalize capital accountsper se.
20 Brief for Appellant at 9, Orrisch v. Commissioner, 31 P-H Am. Fed. Tax Rep. 1069
(9th Cir. 1973):
The Tax Court in its decision finds it incredible that equalization of the
capital accounts was the objective of the special allocation. Clearly, the Tax
Court misread the evidence, for nowhere is this stated to be the objective;
rather the evidence states that the depreciation was allocated because of the
inequity in the capital and the likelihood of Orrisch having to put in more
money.
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investment, and it is apparent that the economic burden
of the depreciation (which is reflected by the allowance
for depreciation) was not'intended to be the medium used.21
The court, therefore, admitted that the increased disparity in capital
accounts did not negate the possibility that equalization of invest-
ment was the goal of the special allocation. More importantly,
it held that equalization of investment could not be accomplished
in the manner attempted.
Orrisch therefore contains a strong suggestion that initial contri-
bution to capital is not an appropriate determinant of the alloca-
tion of depreciation deductions if initial capital contributions do
not also control the allocation of any of the economic benefits
or burdens of the partnership. Stated differently, depreciation
deductions may not be allocated according to the ratio of what
the partners put in to the partnership unless that ratio also deter-
mines the allocation of some economic incident of what the partners
pull out of the partnership. More specifically, it is not persuasive
to assert that the substantial business purpose of an allocation
of depreciation is to compensate selected partners for their greater
cash investment if the allocations of partnership cash benefits
fail to reflect a similar purpose. This analysis need not be confined
to allocations of depreciation deductions. It would appear to be
equally applicable to allocations of overall partnership loss. Consider,
for example, the fairly common situation of the partnership that
has a positive cash flow yet reports a tax loss that is entirely
due to depreciation deductions.22 It would seem that the same princi-
21 55T.C.at 402 n. 5.
22 In an investment in depreciable real estate, taxable income will be less than net
cash flow in any year in which the depreciation deduction claimed exceeds the amount
of cash spent to retire the principal on outstanding indebtedness. Stated differently,
taxable income will be less than the net amount of cash actually produced whenever
the deduction for the non-cash expense of depreciation exceeds the amount of money
actually spent to amortize indebtedness, a cash expense for which there is no corres-
ponding deduction. The essential point is that there is a gap between actual cash
expenditures for which there is no current deduction and fictional deductions that are
available without actual cash expenditures. An investment in depreciable real estate
produces tax losses notwithstanding net cash flow whenever the depreciation deduc-
tion is greater than the sum of net cash flow plus the amount of principal paid on
indebtedness-when, after the depreciation deduction is applied to "shelter" from tax
net cash flow and debt amortization, surplus depreciation deductions remain.
Consider, for example, an apartment house that, in a given year, has $10,000 in rent
receipts, $500 in real estate taxes, $400 in maintenance expenses, $900 repayment of
principal on indebtedness, $8,000 payment of interest on indebtedness, and a $1,200
depreciation deduction. The net cash flow of the property is as follows:
N.C.F. R.R. R.T. M.E. ( P + I )
=$10,000 - 500 - 400 (900 + 8,000)
N.C.F. =$200
The taxable income or loss of the property can be stated in terms of net cash flow as
follows:
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pies should apply as apply to the allocation of depreciation itself.23
Stated differently, there is nothing about the Orrisch opinion
that suggests that it applies only to naked allocations of depreciation
and not to allocations of tax losses that represent the surplus
depreciation that remains after depreciation has first been applied
to shelter net cash flow and debt amortization from tax.
If this interpretation is correct and not simply the product of
pathological conservatism, the next question is what must be done
to the special allocation of depreciation, or to the allocation of
overall partnership loss, to enable it to pass muster under the princi-
pal purpose limitation. Is it sufficient to correlate it either with net
cash flow, with proceeds of refinancing, or with proceeds in the
event of sale of partnership property? Or is one of these economic
incidents more important than the other, depending on the situation?
There is no clear answer to these questions,24 but the court in
Orrisch suggested that the allocation would have been upheld if
it had had some impact on the distribution of proceeds in the
event of sale of partnership property:
To find any economic effect of the special allocation
agreement aside from its tax consequences, we must, there-
fore, look to see who is to bear the economic burden
of the depreciation if the buildings should be sold for
a sum less than their original cost.25
If this is a general rule, does it apply in the case of an highly
leveraged property? The 'fact that the buildings in Orrisch were
heavily encumbered may indicate that the answer is yes.2 6 If so,
T.I. N.C.F. D + P
$200 -1,200 + 900
T.I. ($100)
The two adjustments made to net cash flow to arrive at the $100 tax loss are necessary
because of the conversion from a cash dimension to a tax dimension. Net cash flow is,
most simply, cash in minus cash out. Monies spent to repay principal on indebtedness
constitute cash out and hence are subtracted in the computation of net cash flow. How-
ever, principal repayment is a cash expense for which there is not deduction, and hence
must be added back on to net cash flow when converting net cash flow to taxable in-
come or loss. Conversely, depreciation deductions do not enter into the computation of
net cash flow because they have no current cash reality. They do, however, have tax
reality and must be subtracted from net cash flow when converting net cash flow to tax-
able income or loss.
23 But see F.C. McDougal, 62 T.C. 720 (1974), which constitutes at least some au-
thority for the proposition that a partner may be allocated the entire amount of his part-
nership's overall tax loss when he could not properly be allocated the entire partner-
ship depreciation deduction.
24 See the discussion of the new reallocation mechanism in the 1976 Act, text
accompanying notes 98-111, infra.
25 55 T.C. at 403.
26 See McGuire, When Will A Special Allocation Among Partners Be Recognized?,
37 J. Tax. 74 (1972), for the opinion of a very able commentator to the effect that an
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the allocation of net cash flow could continue independent of the allo-
of depreciation or overall loss.
On the other hand, reiiance on the Orrisch dictum may be mis-
placed. There are two basic ways in which an allocation of
depreciation can be grounded on proceeds of sale of partnership
property. First, special allocations of depreciation may be applied
to reduce the extent to which the recipients of the depreciation
share in sale proceeds. He who receives $100 of depreciation
shall have his share of sale proceeds reduced by $100. This is the
general approach suggested by the Orrisch dictum. On the one
hand, it appears initially to have economic effect. On the other,
it does not appear to have a business purpose. It is difficult to
argue that a special allocation of depreciation is a reward for greater
capital contribution if the allocation has the effect of reducing the
recipient's share of sale proceeds. Second, the allocation of sale
proceeds may be made in accordance with the allocation of depre-
ciation. He who receives 80% of the depreciation deductions shall
receive 80% of sale proceeds. The "reward" argument is more persua-
sive in this second type of arrangement. However, under either
approach, the realities of an highly-leveraged real estate partner-
ship may suggest that tax avoidance eclipses business purpose
if me allocation of depreciation or overall loss is correlated only with
proceeds of sale. Most, if not all, of sale proceeds may be applied
to retire outstanding mortgage financing. In such a situation,
the allocation of sale proceeds may be little more than a paper allo-
cation. Similarly, substantial debt service requirements may render
net cash flow minimal or nonexistent. Therefore, the true interest
in cash benefits would lie in the partners' ratio for sharing re-
financing proceeds. In conslusion, the safest possible approach is
to correlate the allocation of depreciation or overall loss in ac-
cordance with at least some portion of what will be, in the
partnership in question, a meaningful measure of anticipated cash
benefits.
B. "Soft Money"Allocationm.
Special allocations of "soft money" items are extremely common.
"Soft" money or dollars are those applied to expenses that are
currently deductible. The issue is whether the partnership may
allocate the deduction generated to particular partners on the ground
that their contributions were used to meet the expenditures. If,
for example, our much-maligned 50-percent bracket investor can have
his entire cash contribution applied upon his admission to a
deductible expenditure and be allocated the entire corresponding
deduction, the result is an immediate return to him of half his
cash investment in the form of savings on his tax bill. The overall
alteration in the allocation of proceeds of refinancing or sale would have been suffi-
cient to support the special allocation of all the depreciation to the Orrisches.
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desirability of such an allocation is enhanced if his fellow partners
have no need for the deduction.
As is true in other areas of partnership allocations, there is
relatively little authority on soft money allocations. Perhaps the
most frequently cited is Example 5 of the principal purpose Regu-
lations,27 which concerns a partnership formed by G and H to
develop and market electronic devices. H contributed $2,500 in
cash and his full-time services and G contributed $100,000 in
cash and the promise to obtain a loan for the partnership of
any additional funds needed. Their agreement provides that all
research expenditures and interest on partnership loans are to be
charged to G. It also allocates to G 90 percent of partnership
income or loss, computed without reduction by such research and
interest expenditures, until all loans have been repaid and G has
been returned all research and interest expenditures, plus his share
of any partnership operating losses. Thereafter, G and H are to share
profits and losses equally.
Example 5 permits all research expense and interest deductions
to be allocated to G because those expenses "are in fact borne
by G." It is significant that G's priority on return until his re-
covery of expenses did not prevent the allocation to him of all
deductions generated by those expenses. The rationale, presumably,
is that G bears the economic risk that partnership operations will
not be successful enough to reimburse him. In this connection,
Example 5 requires a broad word of caution. Construed most
narrowly, it concerns only the classic combination of the service
partner and the money partner who bears almost all of the cash
investment risk of the enterprise and receives a special allocation
of the deductions for categories of expenses he alone shoulders.
It does not authorize money partners to freely trace their contri-
butions to whatever expenditures comport with their individual tax
pictures and claim the particular deductions, gains, losses, or increase
in bases that result.2 8
Example 5 also requires a note of caution in connection with
limited partnerships that own leveraged depreciable property. The
use of an initial high sharing ratio to return a greater cash
contribution of some sort is frequently referred to as a "pay-back
period." Pay-back periods are often used to allocate high per-
centages of early years' tax losses to limited partners. Perhaps
most typically, limited partners are allocated an extremely high per-
centage of partnership taxable income or loss until they have been
returned a specified percentage of their initial capital contributions.
Although the allocation may be stated in terms of taxable income
or loss in the alternative, the early years of the partnership will
most commonly produce tax losses, not taxable income. Indeed,
27 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2), Example 5 (1964).
28 See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2), Example 3 (1964).
TAX CONFERENCE
partnership tax losses in early years are likely to far exceed those
in later years because accelerated depreciation methods will bunch
deductions in early years and because only a small portion of
debt service in those years will be attributable to the non-deductible
expense of repayment of principal.
The result can be contrasted with the situation in Example 5.
The latter concerned a special allocation of deductions in the amount
of actual cash expenditures by the partner who made them. The
losses allocated to the limited partners during the pay-back period,
on the other hand, are likely to be far in excess of partnership
cash expenditures, because of depreciation deductions, and far in
excess of the dollar amount of the initial capital contributions of
the limited partners. The reason is, of course, that depreciation is
computed on the basis of total acquisition cost, even if the property
is acquired entirely with borrowed funds. 29 The limited partners
may deduct losses in excess of their actual cash investment to
the extent they share in the partnership's non-recourse liabilities.30
Indeed, it is not uncommon for limited partners to be allocated
losses in excess of their actual cash investment in the first two
years of the partnership. 3' It is true that the losses may in part
reflect actual cash expenditures, such as interest payments, but
those expenses, especially after the partnership's initial year, will
typically be made from partnership gross receipts and not traceable
to the contributions of the limited partners. This situation shall
be considered more extensively in the discussion below of bottom-
line allocations. 32 The short of it for the moment is that the priority
on partnership losses should conservatively be correlated with
something more than the initial capital contributions of the limited
partners. As a practical matter, this may be required in any event.
For example, Blue Sky Commissioners may insist on a pay-back
period that gives the limited partners a priority on net cash flow
that corresponds with their priority on partnership losses.33
29 Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947); Manuel Mayerson, 47 T.C. 340 (1966).
10 Code §§ 704(d) and 725(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.725-1(e) (1960).
-11 See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 74-17, 1974-1 Cum. Bull. 438, in which the Service refused to
issue advance Rulings on tax classification unless:
The aggregate deductions to be claimed by the partners as their distribu-
tive shares of partnership losses for the first two years of operation of the
limited partnership will not exceed the amount of equity capital invested in
the limited partnership.32 See infra, text accompanying notes 53 to 75.
.3 See, e.g., Midwest Securities Commissioners Association, Statement of Policy
Regarding Real Estate Programs IV E (July 22, 1975):
E. Promotional Interest. An interest in the limited partnership will be
allowed as a promotional interest and partnership management fee, pro-
vided the amount or percentage of such interest is reasonable. Such an inter-
est will be considered presumptively reasonable if it is within the limitations
expressed in either subparagraph I or 2 below:
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Revenue Ruling 66-18734 is relevant to soft money allocations
even though it involved an allocation of tax-preferred income
rather than expense deductions. It concerned a partnership formed
to acquire and distribute a single issue of tax-exempt municipal
bonds. Each partner subscribed for a partion of the bond issue
and was obligated to pay for its proportionate share of any bonds
remaining unsold on termination of the syndicate. However, the
funds advanced by the partners to enable the syndicate to acquire
the bonds, which they treated as contributions to capital and not
as loans, were not in proportion to their participation.3 5 Upon
termination of the syndicate, net profit or loss was allocated
among the members in proportion to their participation, but the tax-
exempt interest that accrued on the bonds during the existence of
the syndicate was allocated among the members who advanced
the funds to acquire the bonds. The Ruling upheld the alloca-
tion, stating that it had "substantial economic effect" because it
allocated "the bond interest to those members who in fact provided
the funds to purchase the bond issues." 36
The Ruling can be interpreted as additional support for soft
money allocations because it permitted the partners, each of whom
could have been required under their agreement to contribute
his pro-rata share of the front money, to decide among themselves
who would actually supply the front money and receive the tax-
exempt income. Because the partners actually received the cash
benefit of that income, it would have been difficult to state under
the facts given that the allocation lacked business purpose or sub-
stantial economic effect and should be disregarded. On the other
hand, if it were shown that the allocation of the profit or loss
on the resale of the bonds was amended to reflect the earlier
allocation of tax-exempt income, the arrangement would presumably
i. An interest equal to 25% in the undistributed cash amounts remaining
after payment to investors of an amount equal to 100% of capital contribu-
tion; or
2. An interest equal to:
(1) 10% of distributions from cash available for distribution; and
(ii) 15% of cash distributions to investors from the proceeds remaining
from the sale or refinancing of properties after payment to investors of an
amount equal to 100% of capital contributions, plus an amount equal to 6%
of capital contributions per annum cumulative, less the sum of prior distribu-
tions to investors from cash available for distribution.
3. For purposes of this Section, the capital contribution of the investors
shall only be reduced by a cash distribution to investors of the proceeds from
the sale or refinancing of properties.
1966-2 Cur. Bull, 246.
35 Although the syndicate manager could require members to contribute their pro-
portionate shares of any deposits that had to be made on the bonds and any amounts
necessary to carry them, he had discretion to raise the necessary funds however he
wished, subject to the right of each partner to furnish its proportionate share.
311 966-2 Cum. Bull. at 248.
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be held to involve an impermissible juggling of tax consequences
without the requisite business purpose or economic effect. 37
The greatest significance of the Ruling may lie in its use of
the term "special allocation." It proceeded from the partners'
characterization of the voluntary advances as capital contributions
to describe the allocation of tax-exempt income based thereon as
a "special allocation." To emphasize: even though the allocation was
based on the partners' initial capital contributions it was treated as a
special allocation, that is, an allocation that is subject to the principal
purpose limitation. It was special because it was not in accordance
with the partners' overall sharing ratio. The Ruling, therefore, echoes
the note of warning sounded in Orrisch to the effect that an allo-
cation of tax benefits may be subject to being disregarded under
the principal purpose limitation even though it runs in favor of
partners who had made greater initial contributions to capital.
Revenue Ruling 68-13938 involved a soft money allocation of
the entire contribution of two partners. The ABC partnership was
formed when B and C each received a portion of A's working
interest in oil and gas leases for their promise to contribute equal
amounts to drill and equip the partnership's first test well. The
partnership elected to expense intangible drilling and development
costs39 and B and C made their contributions as various stages
of completion were reached. Their entire contribution was spent
drilling the well and was sufficient to complete it.
The partnership agreement provided that all items of
cost were to be allocated to the partners in accordance
with their portion of the contributions to the respective
items of cost. In determining contributions to intangible
drilling and development costs, the initial payments of
B and C made pursuant to the partnership agreement,
would, to the extent so expended, represent their respec-
tive contributions to the intangible drilling and develop-
ment costs incurred by the partnership.40
The Ruling said that allocation of the intangible drilling and
development costs to B and C would be recognized "unless ex-
amination discloses that the principal purpose of the allocation
is the avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax." 4'
The Ruling may not constitute as strong authority in support
of soft money allocations as it initially appears. Its scope is
vague because so few facts are presented. One is left to wonder
what further facts might be revealed that would indicate a viola-
3' Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2), Example 3(1964).
38 1968-1 Cum. Bull. 311.
39 See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.612-4(a)(1965) and 1.703-1(b)(1) (1974).
40 1968-1 Cum. Bull. at 311.
41 1968-1 Cum. Bull. at 312. Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2) Example 3 (1964).
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tion of the principal purpose limitation. For example, the Ruling
does not specify whether A's capital investment was prior to or
contemporaneous with the admission of B and C.42 It did state
that B and C each received a 3/32 working interest and that A
"retained the remaining 26/32 working interest." Therefore, there
is a suggestion that A's investment was prior to that of B and C
and that A was in need of funds to complete the test well. This
may explain why the Ruling referred to the "business purpose"
test in upholding the allocation. On the other hand, it also fails
to identify the relative tax pictures of the partners. The point
of peering down the mouth of this gift-horse Ruling is to suggest
that the Service might not reach the same decision if it were clear
that the contributions of the partners were contemporaneous and
that A was allocating the soft moeny items to high-bracket investors
when he had little or no need for the deductions.
S. Rex Lewis 43 is perhaps the most recent and the most striking
victory for soft-money allocations. Taxpayer Lewis was a prac-
ticing attorney who also had a one-half interest in Howard and
Lewis Investments ("HLI"), a partnership organized to invest in
real estate. HLI became an equal participant with Anchorage in
the ownership of an apartment complex.
As a precondition to HLI's participation in the
project, it was agreed that [Lewis] and Howard would pay
the first $80,000 of interest to accrue on the construction
loan."
At a December 28 loan closing, $80,000 of interest was prepaid
with funds produced by Lewis and Howard. The entire deduction
for this expense was allocated to HLI, that is, to Lewis and Howard.
The Service persuaded the Tax Court that HLI and Anchorage
were, for federal income tax purposes, not mere coowners but
partners whose sharing ratio was 50-50. The Service had fought
for this result to apply the principal purpose limitation to the
allocation of the entire prepaid interest deduction to HLI.
The record discloses that HLI's relationship with
Anchorage entailed considerably more than the simple
coownership of property. Anchorage was responsible for
the management of the [project] and was compensated
for its services out of the gross rents realized on the
complex. In the management of the complex by Anchorage
we perceive sufficient business activity to support the
conclusion that a partnership did exist in which HLI's
distributive share was 50 percent.45
42 Indeed, it did not specify that A had made any capital investment.
43 65 T. C. 625 (1975).
44 65 T.C. at 633.
45 65 T.C. at 632. There are too few facts in the opinion to support an attempt to
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The Service's victory on the classification issue was somewhat
pyrrhic because the court went on to hold that the principal
purpose limitation had not been violated. It sustained the allocation
to HLI of the prepaid interest deductions "because the economic
burden of them was borne by [Lewis] and Howard." 46
Lewis is striking because a large portion of the prepayment
of interest had clearly been made for tax purposes and not for
business purposes. Only $36,000 of the $80,000 prepayment of in-
terest made at the December 28 closing was required by the lender
to be made at that time. The remaining $44,000 was a voluntary
prepayment by HLI of the bulk of the interest that would accrue
the following year.47 Furthermore, the entire $80,000 prepayment
was made with funds borrowed by Lewis and Howard. Most
significantly, the court found that "no advantages were secured
by prepaying $44,000 of interest."48 The court treated these facts
as of no consequence once it determined that the deduction itself
would not be disallowed as a material distortion of income or
on other grounds.49 In short, even though the $44,000 soft money
payment had been made entirely for tax advantage, once the de-
duction itself passed muster it was appropriate to allocate it to
the partners who bore the expense. It did appear that Anchorage
needed and insisted on HLrs contribution of $80,000 for interest
payments. A different result might be reached if one of several
money partners insists that his entire contribution be traced to the
soft money items.
The facts in Lewis suggest the additional point that soft money
allocations often include payments to partners. It is common,
for example, for the contributions of limited partners to be applied
to salaries or fees to general partners. The Code provides that pay-
ments to a partner for services or for the use of capital may be
treated as payments to an outsider to the extent they are "deter-
mined without regard to the income of the partnership. " 50 This
so-called "guaranteed payment" provision has been abused because
reconcile Lewis with Rev. Rul. 75-374, 1975-2 Cum. Bull. 261, which stated that co-
owners of an apartment project can provide customary services without being deemed
a partnership for tax purposes.
4 65 T.C. at 633.
47 The $44,000 was deductible only to the extent it was not refundable.
48 65T.C. at 631. Compare James A. Collins, 54T.C. 1656(1970).
49 For a discussion of Lewis as a prepaid interest case, see Weary and Wilbert, How
Does Tax Court's Retreat on Prepaid Interest Deduction Affect Taxpayers?, 44 J. Tax
258 (1976). See also Section 208 of the 1976 Act. In Bernard Resnik, 66 T.C. No. 10
(May 12, 1976), the court held that the material distortion of income test would first be
applied at the partnership level. It declined to state whether a deduction of prepaid
interest that passed muster at the partnership level might be examined for distortion
at the partner level.
50 Code § 707(c) provides as follows:
(c) Guaranteed Payments.-To the extent determined without regard to
the income of the partnership, payments to a partner for services or the use
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some have reported on the assumption that payments that fall
within its description are automatically deductible. Recent authority
highlights what should have been clear all along: guaranteed pay-
ments can not be used to convert capital expenditures into im-
mediately deductible items. If the payment must be capitalized
if made to an outsider, it must be capitalized if made to a partner. 5'
The "without regard to income" requirement for guaranteed pay-
ment treatment merits a strong word of caution. Recall that, in
Lewis, Anchorage received a management fee of a percentage
of the gross rentals derived from the project. Until very recently
it was generally assumed that payments to a partner for services
based on a percentage of gross receipts satisfied the "without regard
to income" requirement. It was also assumed, on the other hand, that
payments to a partner for services based on a percentage of
net receipts would violate the requirement. If the payment is deemed
to be based on income, it will be treated not as a guaranteed
payment but as a distribution of partnership income, which does
not result in a deduction to the partnership. The recent case
of Edward T Pratt52 rejected rather summarily the distinction
between payments based on gross receipts and payments based
on net receipts. It held that payments to a partner for managing
a shopping center based on gross rent receipts did not qualify as
guaranteed payments because they were "based on income." Pratt
is currently on appeal to the Fifth Circuit and should be followed
carefully by planners making allocations through guaranteed pay-
ments.
C. "Bottom-Line"Allocations.
A partnership's taxable income or loss is known as its "bottom-
line." In short, it is the total of all items of partnership income
and deduction other than those that have been specially allocated. 53
A bottom-line allocation is the ratio by which partners share in the
overall taxable income or loss of the partnership. In many partner-
ships, the bottom-line allocation determines not just the overall
taxable income or loss of the partnership but also all of the economic
consequences of partnership operations. Each partner has one,
overall sharing ratio that determines his allocation of cash flow,
capital gains or losses, taxable income or loss, etc. At the other
extreme from this all-controlling bottom-line allocation is what
can be referred to as a "pure" bottom-line allocation: one that
of capital shall be considered as made to one who is not a member of the
partnership, but only for the purposes of section 61(a) (relating to gross
income) and section 162(a) (relating to trade or business expenses).
51 Stated differently, a payment that otherwise qualifies under § 707(c) will not re-
sult in a current deduction if it constitutes a capital expense. Jackson E. Cagle, Jr.,
63 T.C. 86 (1974) and Rev. Rul. 75-214, 1975-1 Cum. Bull. 185.
52 64 T.C. 203 (1975).
53 Code § 702(a)(9).
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apportions the partnership's taxable income or loss without also
allocating the economic consequences of partnership operations.
Pure bottom-line allocations arise when additional ratios are used
to allocate the cash consequences of partnership operations.
Pure bottom-line allocations have been particularly common in
real estate tax shelters because they enable cash benefits to be
allocated quite differently than tax losses. It is fairly common
for the partnership agreement to provide different ratios for sharing
net cash flow, proceeds in the event of any refinancing or sale
of partnership property, and partnership taxable income or loss. The
allocation of taxable income or loss under such an arrangement
is a pure bottom-line allocation that controls only tax consequences
because different allocation ratios are used to allocate the various
cash benefits. The following hypothetical summarizes the provisions
in a partnership agreement that would effect such an arrangement:
A limited partnership is formed with general partner G
and limited partners A and B. The partnership agreement
provides that net cash flow will be allocated 50% to G and
25% each to A and B; that the proceeds of any refinancing
or sale of the partnership assets will be allocated 60% to
G and 20% each to A and B; and that the partnership's tax-
able income or loss shall be allocated among the partners
in proportion to their initial contributions to capital. G
makes no initial contribution to capital and A and B each
make an initial contribution to capital of $5,000. An apart-
ment house is acquired for $100,000, paid for with the initial
contributions to capital and the proceeds of a $90,000 non-
recourse loan.
The three different allocation ratios, all or none of which might
be brought into play in a particular year, depending on the
results of partnership operations, may be summarized as follows:
Proceeds of
Refinancing Taxable Income
Net Cash Flow or Sale or Loss
G 50% 60% 0%
A 25 20 50
B 25 20 50
The attractiveness of this type of arrangement to a promoter
who wants to retain a substantial interest in cash benefits and
pass the bulk of tax benefits to his high-bracket investor-partners
is clear. Although the bottom-line allocation is stated in terms
of income or loss in the alternative, the typical tax shelter partner-
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ship will produce only tax losses, not taxable income, at least
in the early years. Indeed, if substantial amounts of taxable income
are ever expected, the partnership agreement may provide that
the bottom-line allocation change, or "flip-flop," before that occurs.
The change may be couched in terms of the completion of the
type -of "pay-back" period discussed above. In short, by allocat-
ing tax losses according to initial contribution to capital, and by
disclaiming any initial contribution to capital on his own part,
G has established a fixed ratio that passes to the limited partners
the benefit of all depreciation and other deductions beyond those
necessary to shelter from tax the net cash flow and debt amorti-
zation of the partnership. That is, the limited partners receive
all surplus deductions.
The basic arrangement described above is usually modified in
two ways. 54 First, the general partner is usually given at least
some portion of the partnership's bottom line. This has been parti-
cularly true since Revenue Procedure 74-17, 55 in which the Service
refused to rule on tax classification unless the combined interest
of all the general partners in each item of partnership income,
gain, loss, deduction or credit is at least one percent throughout
the life of the partnership. Thus in the hypothetical transaction
just described, G would credit himself with at least a small initial
contribution to capital so he would receive some portion of the
partnership's taxable income or loss. Second, the general partner typi-
cally receives a substantial portion of annual cash benefits in addition
to his allocable share of the partnership's net cash flow. These addi-
tional cash benefits take the form of guaranteed payments, which are
deducted by the partnership in the computation of net cash flow avail-
able for distribution. 56
There are three tax reasons why general partners are frequently
allocated substantial cash benefits in the form of guaranteed
payments rather than through larger distributive shares of net cash
54Net cash flow, proceeds of refinancing or sale, and taxable income or loss are the
three basic dimensions of partnership operations and discussion is cast in those terms
for the sake of clarity of presentation. In practice, the partnership agreement may con-
tain much more elaborate allocation provisions than the basic model under discussion.
First, the classes of items subject to separate allocations may be more numerous. There
may be, for example, separate allocations of: ordinary income; ordinary loss; capital
gains; capital loss; net cash flow; proceeds of refinancing; and proceeds of sale. Indeed,
if the partnership holds more than one property, there may be different sharing ratios
for each property. Second, the allocation ratios may apply only to particular slices of
each category. Thus, for example, partners A and B may share the first ten thousand
dollars of annual cash flow on a 50-50 basis, the second ten thousand on a 60-40 basis,
etc. Third, the allocation ratios, within each slice of each category, may change over
time. Thus, for example, A may be entitled to 50 percent of the first ten thousand dollars
of annual cash flow only until he has recovered the amount by which his capital contri-
bution exceeded that of B.
55 1974-1 Cum. Bull. 438.
56 See supra, text accompanying notes 50-52.
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flow. The first is to increase the amount of partnership tax losses
generated for distribution to the investor-partners through the
bottom-line allocation. 57 If guaranteed payment treatment is appro-
priate, the partnership will receive a deduction it otherwise would
not have, and the general partner will have to include the amount
of the payment in income. If he has surplus losses from other sources,
the deduction is generated at no additional cost to anyone other
than the Treasury.
Second, the general partner may be allocated a substantial
portion of his cash benefits in the form of guaranteed payments
in order to increase the amount of losses that may be deducted
by the limited partners. Limited partners may not deduct losses in
excess of their bases in their partnership interests.5 8 Each limited
partner has a basis in his partnership interest that includes his cash
contribution plus his share of partnership liabilities. 59  Limited
partners share in partnership liabilities for basis purposes only if
those liabilities are fully non-recourse.60 There is no discretion
to allocate liabilities for basis purposes: limited partners auto-
matically share in non-recourse liabilities in the same proportion
as they share in partnership profits.6' Assume that the partners'
interest in net cash flow is their interest in profits.62 If the limi-
ted partners were to receive a relatively small interest in net
cash flow they would automatically receive only a small amount
51 Code § 707(c) and Treas. Reg. § 1.707-1(c)(1958).
51 Code § 704(d). Treas Reg. § 1.704-1(d)(1)(1964):
A partner's share of loss in excess of his adjusted basis at the end of the part-
nership taxable year will not be allowed for that year. However, any loss so
disallowed shall be allowed as a deduction at the end of the first succeeding
partnership taxable year, and subsequent partnership taxable years, to the
extent that the partner's adjusted basis for his partnership interest at the end
of any such year exceeds zero....
59 Code §§ 722 and 752(a).
60 Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e)(1956).
61 Id.
.
62 There is no generally agreed-upon definition of the term "profits." Many discuss
the term as the partners' overall ratio for sharing -profits or losses," that is, as the
partnership's bottom-line. See, e.g., Pennell, Tax Considerations in Organizing a Part-
nership, 25 U.S.C. Tax Inst. 333, 376. What is the interest in profits in the case of a pure
bottom-line allocation? It is submitted that the answer to this question is the same as
the answer to the question what is the Code's reallocation mechanism. That is, the prof-
its interest is the measure by which the partners share in the economic benefits of part-
nership operations. This could be their ratio for sharing net cash flow, the proceeds of
refinancing, or the proceeds of sale. It could be viewed as a combination of all three that
should also take into account the extent to which cash distributions are made in the
form of guaranteed payments. The 1976 Act legislative history makes clear that the
profits interest in a particular partnership is not necessarily either the partnership's
bottom-line or the interest in net cash flow. The Senate Report explains the new re-
allocation mechanism, in part, as follows:
In determining a "partner's interest in the partnership", all the facts and
circumstances are to be taken into account. Among the relevant factors
are the interests of respective partners in profits and losses (if different from
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of partnership liabilities for basis purposes. To avoid this result,
cash is siphoned off to the promoter in the form of guaranteed
payments to enable the limited partners to claim a larger propor-
tionate interest in net cash flow, that is, in profits. They therefore
claim a larger share of partnership liabilities to increase their bases
and, hence, the amount of tax losses they can deduct.
A final reason to allocate cash benefits to the general partner
in the form of guaranteed payments is to give the partnership's
bottom-line allocation economic substance. As we have just seen,
if the general partner is allocated a substantial portion of his
expected cash benefits in the form of guaranteed payments, the
limited partners can be allocated a larger proportion of the partner-
ship's net cash flow. In short, the allocation of net cash flow can
be made to coincide with the allocation of the partnership's taxable
income or loss. If the ratio that allocates taxable income or loss
also allocates net cash flow, a pure bottom-line allocation has been
avoided.
Pure bottom-line allocations should be avoided whenever possi-
ble. Contrast their use to pass surplus deductions to high-bracket
investors with Example 3 of the principal purpose Regulations:
[U]nder an agreement with respect to partnership CD, it is
provided that C's distributive share of income shall be the
first $10,000 of tax-exempt income, and D's distributive
share of income shall be the first $10,000 of dividend income,
the balances to be divided equally. Since the principal pur-
pose of this provision is to allocate tax-exempt interest to
C, who is in a higher income tax bracket than D, it will be
disregarded. 63
Example 3 is extremely significant because it strikes down an allo-
cation that initially appears to have substantial economic effect.
C and D presumably bear the economic risk that their respective
that of taxable income or loss), cash flow; and their rights to distributions of
capital upon liquidation.
S. Rep. No. 94-938 at 100. See, also, text accompanying notes 124-129, infra.
63 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2), Example 3 (1964). The result would be different if the
partner receive all potential gain and risk of economic unprofitability of the underlying
securities:
Exampk (3). Rather than impair the credit standing of the AB partnership
by a distribution, tle partners agree to invest surplus partnership funds in an
equal dollar amount of municipal bonds and corporate stock. The partners
further agree that A is to receive all the interest income and gain or loss from
tax-exempt bonds and B is to receive all the dividend income and gain or
loss from corporate stock. Such allocation has substantial economic effect
and will be recognized in the absence of other circumstances showing that
the principal purpose was tax avoidance or evasion.
Id. Note that even in this situation the Regulations hold open the possibility that the
allocation might be disregarded if the prohibited principal purpose were shown by
"other circumstances." One is left to wonder what those other circumstances might be.
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types of income will not be realized, or will be realized only
after great delay. However, an allocation will not necessarily
have "substantial economic effect" simply because it is made to
correlate with some economic reality. As stated by the court in
Orrisch, the "substantial economic effect" test is violated if the
allocation in question does "not reflect normal business considera-
tions but [is] designed primarily to minimize the overall tax
liabilities of the partners."64
The pure bottom-line allocation in the basic hypothetical under
discussion reflects the common practice of grounding allocations
of taxable income or loss on initial contributions to capital. Does
a pure bottom-line allocation satisfy the principal purpose limita-
tion because it is correlated with initial contribution to capital?
At first blush, it seems reasonable to allocate the partnership's
taxable income or loss in accordance with the capital contributions
of its members, and such an arrangement appears to have sub-
stantial economic effect. On the other hand, we have seen that it
is a simple matter for a general partner to eschew an initial
credit for his contribution of services or property. He may re-
ceive substantial sums in salary, fees, or other distributions, even
though he is credited with no initial contribution. We have also
seen that Orrisch supports the inference that initial contributions
to capital cannot be rewarded with depreciation deductions unless
they are similarly rewarded from the economic benefits of partner-
ship operations. Bottom-line allocations are essentially distributions
of all surplus depreciation deductions that remain after cash flow
and debt amortization have been sheltered from tax. Therefore,
one might expect the Orrisch principle to apply to bottom-line
allocations as well as to naked allocations of depreciation deduc-
tions.65 For these reasons, it is prudent to avoid a pure bottom-
line allocation, even one that is based on initial contributions
to capital. "Business validity" should be given to the ratio that
allocates partnership taxable income or loss by making it control
also the allocation of some economic component of partnership
distributions.
There are those who have argued that bottom-line allocations
are not subject to the principal purpose limitation. The argument
is based on the fact that the principal purpose limitation, by its
terms, applies only to allocations of "any item." The theory is
that "taxable income or loss" is a composite that is not an "item"
within the meaning of this provision. Proponents stress dictum in
Jean V. Kresser66 that indicates sympathy with the position that
allocations of taxable income or loss are not subject to the prin-
cipal purpose limitation. Kresser involved two real estate partner-
64 55 T.C. at 401.
65 But see F.C. McDougal, supra n. 23.
66 54T.C. 1621 (1970).
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ships that were controlled by one William H. Appleton and operated
under oral agreements. Appleton had a large net operating loss
carryover that was to expire if not used by the end of 1965.
At a meeting of less than all the partners it was resolved to allo-
cate all 1965 income to Appleton. It was stated that 1965 income
allocated to Appleton would be restored to the other partners in
subsequent years by reducing his share of distributable income, or,
in years of no net income, by charging him with net losses.
Notwithstanding these pronouncements, actual cash distributions
and withdrawals during 1965 were in less than half the amount
of 1965 taxable income and were made in accordance with the
partners' overall sharing ratios. Indeed, Appleton received cash
distributions in 1965 that were less than 10 percent of 1965
taxable income. What distributions were made were reported as
returns of capital or distributions of income that had been taxed
in prior years.
The court acknowledged that the principal purpose limitation
would have been violated if it were applicable. However, it speci-
fically declined to decide whether the principal purpose limitation
applies "to the composite of all of the partnership's income."6 7
Instead, it relied on two other grounds to disregard the allocation.
First, it said there was no proof that the partnership agreement
had been amended in a manner sufficient to effect the allocation.
Section 761(c) provides that a partnership agreement may be
amended until the time required for filing the partnership return
by consent of all the partners or by any other manner provided
in the partnership agreement. 68  The court was not persuaded
that all partners had agreed to the allocation nor did it find that
partnership allocations could be changed without the consent of all
the partners.
67 54T.C. at 1631 n5:
While we are fully prepared to accept the contention that the principal pur-
pose of the alleged modifications was the "avoidance or evasion" of tax on
Appleton within the meaning of sec. 704(b)(2), we are faced with the peti-
tioners' troublesome argument that sec. 704(b)(2) applies only to "items" of
income, etc., dealt with in pars. (I) through (8) of sec. 702(a) and does not
govern par. (9) relating to the composite of all of the partnership's income
(sometimes referred to as its "ordinary income") which is here involved.
The point is not without difficulty. Although there is general language in
Smith v. Commissioner, 331 F. 2d 298, 301 (C.A. 7), in accord with the Gov-
ernment's argument, the structure of the statute itself and language in the
legislative history would seem to give support to petitioners' position. See S.
Rept. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 379.
Code § 761(c):
(c) Partnership Agreement.-For purposes of this subchapter, a partner-
ship agreement includes any modifications of the partnership agreement
made prior to, or at, the time prescribed by law for the filing of the partner-
ship return for the taxable year (not including extensions) which are agreed
to by all the partners, or which are adopted in such other manner as may be
provided by the partnership agreement.
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Second, the court found that the alleged reallocation of income
to Appleton was a "paper transaction having no consequences of
substance" that "did not in reality shift the 1965 income from the
other partners to him."6 9 The likelihood that Appleton "per-
sonally guaranteed that the amounts allocated to him would be
restored to the other partners regardless of the success or failure
of the enterprises" 70 indicated that the transaction was in the
nature of a loan. On the other hand, said the court, the fact that
Appleton's withdrawals were far less than the amount of income
allocated to him suggested that not even so much as a loan had
occurred.
In short, Kresser is not very strong authority for the proposi-
tion that bottom-line allocations are free from the principal purpose
limitation. It certainly does not even suggest that pure bottom-
line allocations are exempt. The allocation allegedly involved in
Kresser was the opposite of a pure bottom-line allocation: it was
an all-controlling bottom-line allocation. Finally, whatever comfort
might be drawn from the dictum that the principal purpose limita-
tion may not apply is taken away by the court's decision to dis-
regard an allocation of taxable income or loss on economic reality
grounds.
Bottom-line allocations have been less obviously vulnerable than
naked allocations of depreciation because of the wording of the
Code's reallocation mechanism. Recall that Code § 704(b) provides
that if an allocation does not pass muster under the principal
purpose limitation it will be disregarded and reallocated according
to the partners' ratio for sharing "taxable income or loss of the
partnership, as described in section 702(a)(9)." Two questions
immediately present themselves. First, is the reallocation mechanism
the partnership's bottom-line? If the answer is yes, it would be
pointless to apply the principal purpose limitation to a bottom-
line allocation. If the answer is no, the question becomes how to
reallocate a bottom-line allocation that violates the principal purpose
limitation.
The answer to both questions lies in the fact that the reallo-
cation mechanism, the norm of "taxable income or loss, as de-
scribed in section 702(a)(9)," was intended to be the partners'
ratio for sharing the overall economic profits and losses of the
enterprise. Thus, the Regulations consider the effect of an allocation
on "income or loss independently of tax consequences." 7' More
precisely on point, they provide that in the application of the
reallocation mechanism:
the manner in which the net profit or loss (computed after
excluding any item subject to a recognized special alloca-
69 54T.C. at 1631.
70 Id.
" Treas. Reg. § I.704-2(b)(2)(1964) (emphasis added).
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tion) is actually credited on the partnership books to the
accounts of the partners will generally determine each part-
ner's share of taxable income or loss as described in section
702(a)(9). 72.
In short, the Regulations, 73 The Tax Court74 and the commenta-
tors75 have consistently described the reallocation mechanism as
the partners' overall ratio for sharing "profits or losses." There-
fore, if an allocation of taxable income or loss is disregarded
because it controls tax losses and nothing more and is for the
principal purpose of tax avoidance or evasion, the losses should
be reallocated according to the partners' shares in the economic
consequences of the enterprise. This could be reflected in their
share of net cash flow, determined by taking into consideration
guaranteed payments to promoters; their share of proceeds of re-
financing; their share of proceeds of sale; or a combination thereof,
depending on the nature of the partnership, its assets and their
financing.
D. Retroactive Allocations.
The term "retroactive allocations" has been used in a broad
sense to refer to ratios established to allocate items of income or
loss previously accrued. A retroactive allocation in this broad sense
is present if, for example, partners wait until the end of the year
to decide how to divide the results of the year's operations. The
term is more commonly used in a much more narrow sense to
identify allocations to partners of gain or loss incurred prior to
their admission. The retroactivity that is at issue is not that of
the partnership allocation provision itself. The issue is whether a
new partner may share in tax consequences incurred prior to his
admission. Thus, the retroactivity issue is present even if there
is no amendment to the partnership agreement. For example,
some partnership agreements allocate taxable income or loss in
accordance with the partners' capital accounts at the close of the
year. Although the allocation provision itself remains unchanged,
its effect is to allocate preadmission gain or loss to partners
admitted late in the year. The issue has become controversial because
tax shelter partnerships frequently admit limited partners at the
end of the year and allocate them losses as if they had been
members for the entire year. 76 The permissibility of retroactive
allocations in this more narrow sense has been unclear and doubtful.
7 Treas. Reg. § 1.704- 1(b)(1)(1964) (emphasis added).
7. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.704(b)(1) and (2)(1964).
71 Stanley C. Orrisch, 55 T.C. 395,399-400 (1970).
15 See, e.g., Jackson et al, The Internal Revenue Code of 1954: Partnerships, 54
Colum. L. Rev. 1183, 1187(1954).
76 In an highly-leveraged partnership, the amount of losses allocated to the year-end
admittee may exceed the dollar amount of his investment. In order to obtain an advance
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(1) The Arguments Against Retroactive Allocations
The basic argument against retroactive allocations of preadmission
losses has been that the Code requires proration when a partner
is admitted during the year. The provisions that require proration
differ depending on the manner in which the new partner acquires
his interest. If he purchases the entire interest of an existing
partner, the proration mechanism is the partnership's taxable year,
which closes with respect to a partner who sells his entire interest."
The selling partner must claim his distributive share of all items
of partnership income, gain, loss, deduction or credit up until
the point he transfers his partnership interest.78 Strict observance of
this approach would require an interim closing of the partnership
books. To avoid this result, the Regulations provide a less onerous
procedure for determining the selling partner's allocable share:
In order to avoid an interim closing of the partnership
books, such partner's distributive share of items described
in section 702(a) may, by agreement among the partners,
be estimated by taking his pro rata part of the amount
of such items he would have included in his taxable
income had he remained a partner until the end of the
partnership taxable year. The proration may be based on
the portion of the taxable year that has elapsed prior to
the sale, exchange, or liquidation, or may be determined
under any other method that is reasonable.7 9
The transferee must, according to the same proration computa-
tion used by the transferor, report the balance.8 0
If the year-end admittee purchases only a portion of the interest
of an existing partner, proration is also required, but the mechanism
is not the closing of the partnership's taxable year. Section 706
(c)(2)(B) provides:
The taxable year of a partnership shall not close . .
with respect to a partner who sells or exchanges less
than his entire interest in the partnership or with respect
to a partner whose interest is reduced, but such partner's
distributive share of items described in section 702(a)
ruling on partnership classification, it must now be shown that the
aggregate deductions to be claimed by the partners as their distributive
shares of partnership losses for the first two years of operation of the limi-
ted partnership will not exceed the amount of equity capital invested in the
limited partnership.
Rev. Proc. 74-17, 1974-1 Cum. Bull. 438,439.
" Code § 706(c)(2)(A)(i).
"Treas. Reg. § 1.706-1(c)(2)(ii)(1973). He must also include any guaranteed pay-
ments made to him up until that point. Id.
7" Treas. Reg. § 1.706-1(cX2)(ii)(1973).
80 Id.
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shall be determined by taking into account his varying
interests in the partnership during the taxable year.8'
This provision is known as the "varying interests rule." The
Regulations thereunder do not specify how to compute the prora-
tion it requires, and it would appear that the same options are
available as if the proration mechanism were the partnership's
taxable year.
Many year-end admittees, however, do not purchase part or all
of the interest of an existing partner. Instead, they acquire their
interests directly from the partnership. One reason for this approach
is to avoid the automatic termination of the partnership for tax
purposes that would result if there were a sale or exchange of
50 percent or more of the total interest in partnership capital and
profits within a twelve-month period.82 The Regulations state that a
contribution of property is not a sale or exchange for purpose
of the termination rule, 83 and a recent Ruling holds that the ad-
mission of new partners for cash contributions does not result
in termination, even if the new partners receive more than 50
percent of the total interest in partnership capital and profits.8 4
The Regulations caution that an "exchange" of a partnership interest
may be found if a contribution to a partnership is preceded or
followed "within a short period" by a distribution.8 5 An argument
can be made that there is a "turnaround distribution" to existing part-
ners when new admittees are autormatically allocated shares in part-
nership liabilities.8 6 There is, however, no authority that a construc-
tive distribution caused by a shift in partnership liabilities is sufficient
to classify the admission of a new partner as an exchange of a
partnership interest for termination purposes.87
81 Code § 706(c)(2)(B).
2 Code § 708(b)(l)(B). If there were such a termination, not only would the retro-
active allocation be impossible because the year-end admittees would be members of a
-new" partnership rather than the one that incurred the losses, but also accelerated
depreciation methods available only to first users would be unavailable.
13 Treas. Reg. § 1.708-1(b)(I)(ii)(1956).
84 Rev. Rul. 75-423, 1975-2 Cum. Bull. 260.
15 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.708-1(b)(i)(ii) and 1.731-1(c)(3)(1956).
6 A new member of a general partnership automatically shares in partnership
liabilities according to his proportionate share of partnership losses, and a new limited
partner automatically shares in partnership nonrecourse liabilities according to his pro-
portionate share of partnership profits. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e)(1956). Any decrease
in an existing partner's share of partnership liabilities, whether caused by a transfer of
those liabilities to a new partner or otherwise, is treated as a distribution of cash to him
by the partnership. Code § 752(b).
" Compare Sol Diamond, 56 T.C. 530, 546 (1971), affd 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974)
(emphasis added):
Regardless of whether there may be some kind of equitable justification for
giving the parenthetical clause [in the section 721 nonrecognition Regula-
tions] some limited form of affirmative operation scope, as perhaps where
there is a readjustment of partners' shares to reflect services being per-
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The basic argument that proration is required when the year-
end admittee acquires his interest directly from the partnership
is based on the varying interests rule. It applies not just to a
partner who "sells or exchanges" a portion of his interest, but
also to a partner whose interest is "reduced." The total interest
of the existing partners is reduced as new members are allocated
shares in profits, losses, liabilities for basis purposes, etc. There-
fore, the varying interests rule clearly supports a proration require-
ment in the case of a partner who acquires his interest directly
from the partnership. The general policy against "trafficking"
in tax losses supports an argument that any ambiguity should be
resolved in favor of the proration requirement.
(2) The Arguments in Support of Retroactive Allocations.
There are various arguments in support of retroactive allocations
of preadmission losses. The basic position is that the proration
requirement of the varying interests rule is overridden by other pro-
visions of Subchapter K. Specifically, section 704(a) permits allo-
cations to be determined by partnership agreement and section
761(c) states that the partnership agreement includes changes made
until the time required for filing the partnership return. Thus,
the agreement can allocate to new members as if they had been
partners for the entire year. Under this approach, the only limitation
on allocations of preadmission losses is not the varying interests
rule but the principal purpose limitation. This, it is argued, is satisfied
because the admission of the year-end partner has the substantial eco-
nomic effect of placing his capital contribution at risk on account of
partnership losses and partnership liabilities incurred prior to his
admission.88 On the other hand, proponents may argue that not even
the principal purpose limitation applies if the preadmission losses are
allocated through a bottom-line allocation. The theory is the one dis-
cussed above that the principal purpose limitation does not apply to
allocations of overall partnership taxable income or loss. 89
Two additional arguments apply if the varying interests rule
is not overridden by the broad authority of partners to allocate
freely by an agreement amended before the time for filing. The
first is that the words "or with respect to a partner whose
interest is reduced" were intended to apply to partial liquidations
,formed by one of the partners, we cannot believe that the regulations were
ever intended to bring section 721 into play in a situation like the one before
us,
" The effect of this argument is to place a substantial premium on the partnership
form. The shareholders of a Subchapter S corporation are required to prorate their
losses on a daily basis. Code § 1374(c). Consider also that a purchaser of property from
another individual may not deduct part or all of his purchase price on the ground that
it was applied to meet expenses incurred by the seller. Rev. Rul. 75-304, 1975-2 Cum.
Bull. 94.
89 See text accompanying notes 65 to 75, supra.
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and not to the admission of new partners ° The second is that
what must be "reduced" to bring the varying interests rule into
play is the value of the interests of the existing partners, not
merely their sharing ratios. Under this approach, the interest
of the existing partners is not "reduced" if the contributions of
the new partners are equal to the value of the interests they acquire.9'
(3) The Rodman Decision.
The most recent authority in the controversy about preadmission
loss allocations is the Second Circuit's decision in Rodman v.
Commissioner.92 Rodman involved a partnership engaged primarily
in trading publicly the stock of a Canadian company. There were
originally four equal partners, Norman and Robert Rodman, Sidney
Newman and Walter Ornstein. On November 2, 1956, Ornstein sold
his entire interest to the others. Three days later, Martin Rodman
acquired one-ninth interests from Norman and Robert. From then
on, Newman had a one-third interest and Norman, Robert and Martin
Rodman each had a two-ninth's interest. The partnership initially
reported a loss for 1956 and allocated Martin a share of the loss
based on the partnership's entire taxable year. When, however,
the Service determined that there was gain rather than loss,
Martin asserted that he should not be taxed on income that
accrued prior to his admission. The Service persuaded the Tax
Court to hold Martin liable for gains based on the entire year.
On appeal, the Service reversed its position on the retroactivity
issue and conceded that Martin could not share in income or losses
incurred prior to his admission.
The Second Circuit gave three reasons in support of its conclusion
that Martin could not share in income or loss incurred prior
to his admission.93 It said that the retroactive allocation to Martin
violated both the general prohibition against assignments of income
and the principal purpose limitation.
90 Nims, Partnership Retroactive Allocations, 1976-13 BNA Tax Man. Mem. at 3:
It seems logical to surmise that the legislative draftsmen of Sec. 706(c)(2)(B)
were contemplating partial liquidations when they utilized the phrase "a
partner whose interest is reduced." This would provide symmetry with the
concept of sale, exchange or liquidation of the entire interest under Sec. 706
(c)(2)(A). It is self-evident that liquidation or partial liquidation entails
taking something out of the partnership.
9' Contra, I A. Willis, Partnership Taxation 286 (2d ed. 1976):
It is hard to accept the theory that the reduction in interest refers to anything
other than a reduction in proportionate interest. To say that when the pie is
increased enough to offset the reduction in proportionate interest there is no
reduction in interest is an unconvincing exercise in subtle semantics. Further,
adoption of the "size of the pie theory" would require valuations of the part-
nership equity before the contribution and of the contribution made by the
end of the year admittee.
92 76-2 U.S.T.C. 85,258 (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 1976), reversing and remanding Norman
Rodman, 32 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1307 (1973).
91 The Second Circuit's reversal of the Tax Court's decision on the retroactivity issue
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In essence, the present case is no more than an assign-
ment by Robert and Norman of a percentage of their
interests in the income earned by them as partners prior
to Martin's having joined the partnership. As such, not
only does the retroactive allocation of income to a new
partner violate the Helvering v. Horst general assignment
of income prohibition, it necessarily follows . . . that such
an attempted assignment in the partnership agreement
also falls within 704(b)(2)'s caveat that a term in a part-
nership agreement cannot be controlling for tax purposes
where its principal purpose is the evasion of taxes. Conse-
quently, where a new partner is involved in the sale or ex-
change of a partnership interest, we must disagree with the
tax court's conclusion that the intent of the parties . . is the
controlling factor as to whether or not income or losses
which accrued prior to the partner's joining may be re-
allocated to him retroactively.94
Finally, it said that the varying interests rule applied when Robert
and Norman each transferred a portion of their interest to Martin.
Consequently, because Robert and Norman are required
to take into account their varying interests during the part-
nership taxable year, it is only logical that Martin must
do the same. During the partnership year prior to Novem-
ber 6, 1956, Martin had no interest in the partnership.
The only logical conclusion to be drawn from the Code's
provisions dealing with the amounts of a partnership's
income and losses attributable to the parties involved
in the sale or exchange of a partnership interest is that
Martin had a two-ninth's interest in only those items
that accrued after he entered the partnership. To allow
partners by modification of the partnership agreement
to rearrange their interests over periods of time when no
interests in fact existed would be to disregard the pro-
visions of the Code designed specifically to deal with
comes as no surprise. Commentators had noted that the issue was poorly litigated
before the Tax Court and that its decision should not be relied upon. McGuire, Retro-
active Allocations Among Partners: The Rodman Decision, 52 Taxes 325 (1974);
Weidner, Yearend Sales of Losses in Real Estate Partnerships, 1974 U. Ill. L. F_ 533,
545-46.
94 76-2 U.S.T.C. at 85,267 (citations omitted). This portion of the opinion cited
"Treas. Reg. § 1.708-1(e)(l)(i)." There is no such Regulation. The Court presumably
intended to citeTreas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(l)(i)(1964):
The production of income by a partnership is attributable to the capital or
services, or both, contributed by the partners. The provisions of subchapter
K are to be read in the light of their relationship to section 61, which re-
quires, inter alia, that income be taxed to the person who earns it through
his own labor and skill and the utilization of his own capital.
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the allocation of partnership income and losses when
partnership interests are transferred.9 5
Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for an allocation to
Martin of a share of partnership income "based upon the limited time
that he in fact had an interest in the partnership."96
Some commentators will no doubt emphasize that Rodman did not
involve a partner who acquired his interest directly from the
partnership; that it involved the less difficult case of a partner
who received partial transfers from less than all of the existing
partners. They may also stress that the Court's articulation of
all three theories is couched in terms of "sale or exchange" and
remind us once again that the admission of new partners for cash
contributions does not constitute a sale or exchange. Finally,
they may stress that the Court did not discuss whether the interest
of existing partners is "reduced" when a new member is admitted
upon contribution.
The critical significance of the case should not be obscured by
hopeful speculation that a different result might have been reached
if Martin had acquired his interest directly from the partnership
and the interests of all existing partners had been reduced equally.
The opinion makes clear that the varying interests rule can not be
overridden by contrary provisions in the partnership agreement.
It also found a violation of the principal purpose limitation and
assignment of income principles even though Martin's admission
as a new general partner exposed him to unlimited personal liability
for partnership obligations. Perhaps the most striking aspect of the
opinion is the Court's suggestion that assignment of income principles
might prevent the partners from computing proration under the short-
cut method provided in the Regulations. 97
IL. The Tax Reform Act of 1976
A. Retroactive Allocations.
The 1976 Act amends the varying interests rule to clearly require
proration when a new member acquires his interest directly from
the partnership:
The taxable year of a partnership shall not close . . .
with respect to a partner who sells or exchanges less than
his entire interest in the partnership or with respect to
a partner whose interest is reduced (whether by entry of a
new partner, partial liquidation of a partner's interest,
gift, or otherwise), but such partner's distributive share of
items described in section 702(a) shall be determined by
95 76-2 U.S.T.C. at 85,267-68 (emphasis added).
96 Id. at 85,268.
97 See text accompanying notes 106-11I, infra.
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taking into account his varying interests in the partnership
during the taxable year. 98
The amendment applies to partnership taxable years that begin
after December 31, 1975.99 However, the legislative history leaves
unanswered the question whether this provision is a new rule or
simply a clarification of existing law.100
The draftsmen had little sympathy for the argument that new
partners should be allowed to share in deductions incurred prior to
their admission.' 0' They therefore included three supplemental
amendments to make clear that the varying interests rule can not
be avoided by provisions in the partnership agreement. Unfortu-
nately, this intent is more clearly expressed in the legislative
history than in the three amendments themselves. Section 704(a)
is amended somewhat vaguely to reflect that section 704 is not
the exclusive limitation of the partners' authority to determine
partnership allocations by agreement:
A partner's distributive share of income, gain, loss,
deduction, or credit shall, except as otherwise provided
in this chapter, be determined by the partnership agree-
ment. 10
2
9 1976 Act § 213(c)(1), amending Code § 706(c)(2)(B). Italicized partions of quota-
tions from the Code as amended by the 1976 Act indicate the changes made by the 1976
Act unless it is otherwise stated that the quoted section is new or substantially re-
written.
99 1976 Act § 213(t)(i1).
100 Both the House and Senate Reports contain the following statement:
These provisions are effective for taxable years of 'partnerships that begin
after December 31, 1975. The committee does not intend that any inference
be drawn as to the propriety or impropriety of a retroactive allocation under
present law.
H.R.Rep. No. 94-658, 125, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) and S.Rep. No. 94-938, 98, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), (to accompany H.R. 10612, Pub. L. No. 94-455).
101 S. Rep. No. 94-938 at 97:
In essence, the consequence of allowing retroactive allocations is that new
partners investing in the partnership towards the close of the taxable year
are allowed to deduct expenses which were incurred prior to their entry into
the partnership. Some argue that these retroactive allocations are proper
because the funds invested by the new partners serve to reimburse the origi-
nal partners for their expenditures and that, as an economic matter, the new
partners have incurred the costs for which they are claiming deductions.
However, this argument loses its persuasiveness when the new partner in a
partnership situation is compared to that of an investor who directly pur-
chases property which had previously generated tax losses during the taxable
year. It is clear that in the latter case the investor would not be entitled to
deduct the losses incurred prior to his ownership of the property, notwith-
standing the fact that he may, in effect, be reimbursing the seller of property
for losses already incurred.
102 1976 Act § 213(c)(2), amending Code § 704(a).
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Somewhat more specifically, a new subsection 704() directs the
reader to the varying interests rule. 03 Finally, section 761, which
permits partners to amend their agreement until the time for
filing their partnership return, is graced with a similar reference
to the varying interests rule and a reference to section 704(b).104
The legislative history indicates that proration is required both
as to particular items of deduction and as to overall partnership
income or loss.
The conference agreement provides that income or losses
will be allocable to a partner only for the portion of
the year that he is a member of a partnership and not
retroactively to periods prior to entry.105
The history precludes any argument that the year-end admittee
can share in depreciation deductions or the resulting losses on
the basis of the entire year if the partnership does not charge
depreciation on its books until the end of the taxable year.
On the other hand, the legislative history does indicate that partners
are to be given substantial leeway to compute the required pro-
ration:
In determining the income, loss or special item allocable
to an incoming partner, the partnership will either allocate
on a daily basis or separate the partnership year into
two (or more) segments and allocate income, loss or special
items in each segment among the persons who were part-
ners during that segment. 106
Once again, the legislative history makes clear what the Act does
not: partners are to have the same flexibility to compute proration
that they presently have under existing Regulations concerning the
sale by a partner of his entire interest in the partnership. 07
103 1976 Act § 213(c)(3)(A), amending Code § 704:
(f) Cross Reference.-
For rules in the case of the sale, exchange, liquidation, or reduction of a
partner's interest, see section 706(c)(2).
104 1976 Act § 2 10(c)(3)(B), amending Code § 761:
(e) Cross Reference.-
For rules in the case of the sale, exchange, liquidation, or reduction of a
partner's interest, see sections 704(b) and 706(c)(2).
105 Committee on Ways and Means, Summary of the Conference Agreement on the
Tax Reform Act of 1976 (H.R. 10612) 9 (1976).
106 Id.
107 S. Rep. No. 94-938 at 98:
[R]egulations are to apply the same alternative methods of computing al-
locations of income and loss to situations falling under section 706(c)(2)(B)
as those now applicable to section 706(c)(2)(A) situations (sale or liquidation
or an entire interest).
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The drafters understood that the computation alternatives in the
Regulations soften the impact of the proration requirement:
These rules will permit a partnership to choose the easier
method of prorating items according to the portion of
the year for which a partner was a partner or the more
precise method of an interim closing of books (as if the
year had closed) which, in some instances, will be more
advantageous where most of the deductible expenses were
paid or incurred upon or subsequent to the entry of the
new partners to the partnership. 108
Conversely, the percentage-of-the-year approach would be preferable
to the new member if most deductible expenses had been paid or
accrued prior to his admission.
The drafters probably did not understand that, within a few
days after the completion of their efforts, the Second Circuit
would opine in Rodman that the alternative computation methods
in the Regulations could result in an impermissible assignment of
income:
Both Martin and the Commissioner contend that on re-
mand the share attributable to Martin should be computed
simply by multiplying the pro-rata portion of the year during
which he owned his interest (57/366) by his two-ninth's in-
terest. See Treas. Reg. 1.706-1(c)(2). We note, however, that
such a simple pro-rata allocation could in many instances
result in a prohibited income assignment to Martin if, for ex-
ample, the substantial portion of the partnership's income
accrued prior to [his admission]. The record on appeal does
not indicate whether or not such is the case, and we leave
to the tax court to determine whether or not a simple pro
rata allocation is appropriate in this case. 09
As stated earlier in its opinion, 110 a violation of the principal
purpose limitation (now the substantial economic effect require-
ment) follows from the assignment of income conclusion. Given
that the computation alternatives in the Regulations can be dis-
regarded, it seems clear that other strategies to soften the impact
of the proration requirement are also subject to challenge. Consider,
for example, whether the partners can simply refrain from paying
for or accruing expenses until new members are admitted. Such
a strategy, although suggested by the proration Regulations and
the legislative history of the 1976 Act, is an indirect allocation that
presumably must pass muster under 704(b). The essential question
101 Id. (emphasis added)
109 76-2 U.S.T.C. at 85,268 n. 19.
'"0 76-2 U.S.T.C. at 85,267.
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will be the extent to which the timing of the expenditure represents
business purpose or practice rather than tax evasion. An attempt
to trace the contribution of a year-end admittee to a year-end
expenditure to allocate him the resulting deduction will be sub-
ject to the limitations on "soft money" allocations discussed earlier.",
B. The Basic Allocation Rules.
The 1976 Act completely rewrites the basic allocation provision,
subsection 704(b):
(b) Determination of Distributive Share.-A partner's
distributive share of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit
(or item thereof) shall be determined in accordance with
the partner's interest in the partnership (determined by
taking into account all facts and circumstances), if-
(1) the partnership agreement does not provide as to
the partner's distributive share of income, gain, loss,
deduction, or credit (or item thereof), or
(2) the allocation to a partner under the agreement
of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit (or item
thereof) does not have substantial economic effect.12
I See text accompanying notes 27-52, supra.
112 1976 Act § 213(d), amending Code § 704(b). The 1976 Act makes several other
changes in subchapter K that do not deal directly with partnership allocations but
should be mentioned because they are related restrictions on tax shelter partnerships.
The most significant is 1976 Act § 213(e), which provides that, except in the case of
realty partnerships, a limited partner's basis in his partnership interest is not increased
by nonrecourse liabilities. The rule is incorporated by amending section 704(d) to pro-
vide as follows:
(d) Limitation on Allowance of Losses.-A partner's distributive share of
partnership loss (including capital loss) shall be allowed only to the extent
of the adjusted basis of such partner's interest in the partnership at the end
of the partnership year in which such loss occurred.
For purposes of this subsection, the adjusted basis of any partner's interest
in the partnership shall not include any portion of any partnership liability
with respect to which the partner has no personal liability. The preceding
sentence shall not apply with respect to any activity to the extent that section
465 (relating to limiting deductions to amounts at risk in case of certain activ-
ities) applies, nor shall it apply to any partnership the principal activity of
which is investing in real property (other than mineral property).
This new restriction applies to liabilities incurred after December 31, 1976. 1976 Act
§ 213(0(2). The source of this rule was a floor amendment in the Senate, and the Con-
ference Committee Report explains its relationship to the new "at risk" provisions as
follows:
The effect of this provision is to limit deductions which may be passed
through to a limited partner to the amount of investment which he actually
has and will have at risk in the partnership. It is intended that in determin-
ing whether a partner has personal liability with respect to any partnership
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The new 704(b) applies to partnership taxable years that begin
after December 31, 1975.1 3  However, to the extent it merely
clarifies existing law, it applies to all prior taxable years.
One fundamental question about the new 704(b) is whether the
insertion of the "substantial economic effect" requirement to re-
place the "principal purpose" limitation was intended to change
existing law. Surely no clarification results from replacing "principal
purpose" with "substantial economic effect." As explained earlier," 4
it has most commonly been assumed that the essential test for
determining whether an allocation satisfies the principal purpose
liability, the rules of section 465 (relating to the limitation on deductions to
amounts at risk in case of certain activities) will apply. This provision will
not apply to any activity to which section 465 (relating to the limitation on
deductions to amounts at risk in case of certain activities) [sic.] nor will it
apply to any partnership the principal activity of which involves real prop-
erty (other than mineral property).
Conference Committee Report at 9.
1976 Act § 213(b)(3) amends Code § 707(c) to emphasize the existing rule that guar-
anteed payments may not be used to transform capital expenditures into currently de-
ductible items. The new section 707(c) is as follows:
(c) Guaranteed Payments.-To the extent determined without regard to
the income of the partnership, payments to a partner for services or the use
of capital shall be considered as made to one who is not a member of the
partnership, but only for the purposes of section 61(a) (relating to gross in-
come) and, subject to section 263, for purposes of section 162(a) (relating to
trade or business expenses).(emphasis added)
A similar change, albeit one that does more than reiterate existing law, is effected by
1976 Act § 213(b)(1), which adds a new section to subchapter K, section 709:
SEC. 709. TREATMENT OF ORGANIZATION AND SYNDICATION
FEES.
(a) General Rule.-Except as provided in subsection (b), no deduction shall
be allowed under this chapter to the partnership or to any partner for any
amounts paid or incurred to organize a partnersnip or to promote the sale
of(or to sell) an interest in such partnership.
(b) Amortization of Organization Fees.-
(1) Deduction.-Amounts paid or incurred to organize a partnership
may, at the election of the partnership, (made in accordance with regula-
tions prescribed by the Secretary), be treated as deferred expenses. Such
deferred expenses shall be allowed as a deduction ratably over such peri-
od of not less than 60 months as may be selected by the partnership
(beginning with the month in which the partnership begins business),
or if the partnership is liquidated before the end of such 60-month period,
such deferred expenses (to the extent not deducted under this section)
may be deducted to the extent provided in section 165.
(2) Organizational expenses defined.-The organizational expenses to
which paragraph (1) applies, are expenditures which-
(A) are incident to the creation of the partnership;
(B) are chargeable to capital account; and
(C) are of a character which, if expended incident to the creation
of a partnership having an ascertainable life, would be amortized over
such life.
"1 1976 Act § 213(f)( n ).114 See text accompanying notes 10- 17, supra.
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limitation is whether it has substantial economic effect. On the
other hand, this assumed equivalence also indicates that no change
was intended. Indeed, the legislative history contains numerous ref-
erences to existing law for the determination of what constitutes
substantial economic effect. 1 5
Can it be, then, that the addition of "substantial economic effect"
to replace "principal purpose" was intended neither to change nor
clarify existing law? Has the legislature committed a useless act?
The substantial economic effect language was added by the Senate
when it scrapped the revision of 704(b) that was passed by the House.
The House Bill clearly reflected an intent to diminish the ability of
partners to allocate freely. It would have replaced the principal pur-
pose limitation with a two-pronged test. The House Bill would have
disregarded any allocation that is either without "a business purpose"
or that results in a "significant avoidance or evasion of any tax."" 16
The Senate Report states that the substantial economic effect re-
quirement has "essentially" the same intent as the two-pronged test
in the House Bill:
While there is a difference in language, the intent of
the committee amendment and the House bill are essen-
tially the same-both versions seek to prevent the use of
special allocations for tax avoidance purposes, while allow-
ing their use for bona fide business purposes." 7
In a footnote, the Senate Committee explained its reason for
the change:" 8
115 Consider, for example, the following statement in theSenate Report:
Also, the committee believes that allocations of special items and overall
allocations should be restricted to those situations where the allocations
have substantial economic effect, as presently interpreted by the regulations
and case law.
S. Rep. No. 94-938 at 99-100.
116 H.R. 10612 § 210(d) provided that the reallocation mechanism shall not be applied
to allocations agreed upon by the partners if:
the partner receiving the allocation can establish both that there is a busi-
ness purpose for this allocation and that no significant avoidance or evasion
of any tax imposed by this subtitle results from such allocation.
HI S.Rep.No. 94-938at 100.
118 The Senate also scrapped the two-step reallocation mechanism in the House bill:
(b) Determination of Distributive Share.-
(]) Rule for allocations.-A partner's distributive share of income, gain,
loss, deduction, or credit (or item thereof) shall be determined-
(A) in accordance with the partnership's permanent method of allo-
cating the taxable income referred to in section 702(a)(9), if there is such
a method, or
(B) in accordance with the partner's interest in the partnership
(determined by taking into account all facts and circumstances) if the
partnership has no permanent method of allocating such taxable income.
H.R. 10612 §210(d). The Senate retained the "interest in the partnership" feature of
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Because of the use of the phrase "significant avoidance
or evasion of any tax . . . results" (emphasis supplied)
under the House bill, a conceivable interpretation might
cause the disallowance of a special allocation to a high-
bracket taxpayer, notwithstanding that the allocation had
a business purpose and economic substance." 19
Thus, the Senate Report appears to adopt the House Report's
emphasis on the need for a business purpose to support a special
allocation. This will be viewed as a tightening of existing law
by those who did not interpret Orrisch to emphasize business
purpose as the prime determinant of the presence of substantial
economic effect.120
One additional point in the legislative history merits consideration
in connection with the issue of intent to change the basic rules
of partnership allocations. Both the House and the Senate Reports
contain the following statement:
Under the partnership provisions, a limited (or a general)
partnership agreement may allocate income, gain, loss,
deduction, or credit (or items thereof) among the partners
in a manner that is disproportionate to the capital con-
tributions of such partners (see 704(a), (b)(1)). These are
sometimes referred to as "special allocations". . .121
This statement is striking because the term "special allocation"
is the shorthand term that has been used to refer to allocations
that are subject to the principal purpose limitation. Presumably,
the term will be used in the future to refer to allocations that
the reallocation mechanism but dropped the "permanent method" test. It offered the
following explanation for the drop:
The House bill provided a two-step method of reallocation which includes the
provision described above in the [Senate] committee amendment but also
provided for the allocation to be determined in accordance with the partner's
"permanent method of allocating" the taxable income or loss (described
under section 702(a)(9)), if there is such a method. The committee amend-
ment deletes this alternative because of the difficulty in defining "perman-
ent method of allocating" the items.
S. Rep. No. 94-938 at 100. However, it would appear that the "permanent method"
concept was abandoned because the House had based it in part on its two-step replace-
ment for the principal purpose limitation, which the Senate also abandoned:
A partnership will ordinarily be considered to have a "permanent method"
of allocating taxable income or loss if (1) it has consistently applied such
method over a number of years, and (2) it meets both the business purpose
and significant tax avoidance tests provided under the amended section
704(b).
H.R.Rep. No. 94-658 at 127.
19 S.Rep.No. 94-938 at 100 n. 11.
120 See text accompanying notes 13-26, supra.
121 H. Rep. No. 94-658 at 125, S. Rep. No. 94-938 at 98.
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will be subject to the substantial economic effect requirement.
The question can be put simply: does the statement just quoted
imply that allocations based on capital contribution are not special
allocations subject to the substantial economic effect requirement?
Stated differently, does the quoted language indicate that any
allocation based on capital contribution will, by virtue of the cor-
relation, be deemed to have substantial economic effect?
It is submitted that the answer to this question is no: alloca-
tions based on capital contributions should continue to be subject
to the substantial economic effect requirement. To hold otherwise
would convert an artless sentence in the legislative history into
a major liberalization of the law of partnership allocations, particu-
larly as it applies to tax shelters, without any other indication that
a liberalization was intended. It is clear that it would constitute
a liberalization to insulate allocations correlated with capital contri-
butions from challenge. We have seen that Orrisch strongly sug-
gests that depreciation deductions cannot be allocated on the
basis of initial capital contribution unless initial contribution also
controls some economic component of what the partners pull out
of the partnership. We have also considered a Revenue Ruling
that refers to an allocation based on initial capital contribution
as a "special allocation" and subjects it to the principal purpose
limitation. 22  Finally, initial capital contributions can be very
easily manipulated. We have seen, for example, that to allocate
substantial amounts of losses to high-bracket investors, promoters
of tax shelters frequently credit themselves with little or no initial
capital contribution. 23 To forego the credit costs nothing whenever
allocations of cash benefits are made independently of initial
contribution. In short, any interpretation of the statute or legis-
lative history that would place allocations based on capital contri-
butions beyond the substantial economic effect requirement would
constitute a retreat in the law because it would provide a safe
harbor into which the most extreme allocation arrangements could
easily be drafted. Indeed, it would insure promoters of tax shelter
partnerships that they will be free from challenge if they structure
their allocation arrangements in precisely the way they would prefer
to structure them. Not only does such an interpretation grant
promoters a safe harbor they have not had under prior authority,
it also clashes directly with the inescapable purpose of the 1976
Act to subject bottom-line allocations to the substantial economic
effect requirement.
The primary purpose of the new section 704(b) is to make clear
that bottom-line allocations are subject to the same limitations as
allocations of individual items. The new provision changes two
features of 704(b) that have supported arguments that bottom-line
122 Rev. Rul. 66-187, supra n. 34.
123 See text accompanying notes 53-62, supra.
TAX CONFERENCE
allocations are not subject to limitation. First, recall that the
principal purpose limitation, by its terms, applies to allocations
of any "item." It has been argued that the partnership's bottom-
line is not subject to the principal purpose limitation because it is
a "composite" rather than an "item." 124 The new 704(b) makes
it inescapable that the new substantial economic effect requirement
applies to allocations of composites because it includes in every
subsection the disjunctive parenthetical "(or item thereof)." Second,
recall that it has been argued that it is pointless to disregard an
allocation of taxable income or loss only to subject it to the re-
allocation mechanism of "taxable income or loss of the partnership,
as described in section 702(a)(9)."125 The new reallocation mecha-
nism of "the partner's interest in the partnership (determined
by taking into account all facts and circumstances)" applies as
easily to bottom-line allocations as it does to allocations of indi-
vidual items. Both these changes, it is submitted, do nothing more
than clarify existing law. 126
Nevertheless, the clarifications may be the beginning of a new
stage in the development of the law of partnership taxation.
Many fundamental concepts in the area of partnership tax are
extremely undeveloped. A major reason for the lack of develop-
ment is that the provisions of subchapter K are both complex
and obtuse. The Tax Court itself has strongly protested their
obscurity:
The distressingly complex and confusing nature of the
provisions of subchapter K present a formidable obstacle
to the comprehension of these provisions without the ex-
penditure of a disproportionate amount of time and effort
even by one who is sophisticated in tax matters with many
years of experience in the tax field. * * * Surely, a
statute has not achieved "simplicity" when its complex
provisions may confidently be dealt with by at most only
a comparatively small number of specialists who have
been initiated into its mysteries.127
On too many important issues, the cases, Regulations and rulings
fail to give guidance as to the meaning of the statute. The con-
troversy concerning bottom-line allocations is illustrative. Perhaps
it is neither surprising nor indicative of professional incompetence
that many accountants and attorneys have assumed that whatever
constitutes "taxable income or loss" in a partnership agreement
also constitutes "taxable income or loss, as described in section
124 See text accompanying notes 66-70, supra.
125 See text accompanying notes 70-75, supra.
126 See text accompanying notes 53-75, supra, and Weidner, Passing Depreciation
to Investor-Partners, 25 S.C.L.Rev. 215 (1973).
127 David A. Foxman, 41 T.C. 535,551 n. 9 (1964) (citations omitted).
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702(a)(9)" within the meaning of the statute. True, counsel in
other substantive areas are often quickly and properly denounced
for espousing the "plain meaning" of a statute without first
divining its purpose. 28 True, also, that there is no legislative
history that even suggests an intent to give carte-blanche approval
to pure bottom-line allocations that separate tax losses from cash
benefits and deliver them to high-bracket limited partners. The
prevalence of the assumption that bottom-line allocations have been
free from limitation is based in part on the fact that the assumption
is made in an area of the law in which it is often considered
quite an achievement for the non-specialist to divine any meaning,
"plain" or otherwise, from a subchapter calculated more to frus-
trate than inform. Its prevalence is also based in part on the
fact that neither legislative history, judicial decisions, Regulations
nor rulings have offered any clear refutation of the assumption.
The absence of any clear authority affects the staff of the Service
in much the same way as it affects private practitioners, and may
therefore also explain why the assumption has been a safe one
on which to rely.
The new 704(b) precludes continued reliance on the "plain
meaning" of the allocation rules by stripping them of any plain
meaning. The legislative history makes clear that the new re-
allocation mechanism is a flexible standard whose meaning will
depend upon the partnership under consideration:
In determining a "partner's interest in the partnership",
all the facts and circumstances are to be taken into
account. Among the relevant factors to be taken into
account are the interests of respective partners in profits
and losses (if different from that of taxable income or
loss), cash flow; and their rights to distributions of capital
upon liquidation. 129
128 See, e.g., Heydon's Case, 30 Co. 7a, 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (Exch. 1584):
And it was resolved by them [the judges] that for the sure and true inter-
pretation of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive
or enlarging of the common law), four things are to be discerned and consid-
ered:-
I st. What was the common law before the making of the Act.
2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not
provide.
3rd. What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure
the disease of the commonwealth.
And 4th. The true reason of the remedy; and then the office of all the
Judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief,
and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions
for continuance of the mischief, and pro privato commodo, and to add force
and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of
the Act,pro bonopublico.
12 S.Rep. No. 94-938 at 100.
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With this particular clarification comes uncertainty. There is a
change from a rule that had been viewed by many as a fixed
standard with a plain meaning to a rule that appears almost
perfectly elastic.
Regulations are needed to clarify the application of the flexible
reallocation mechanism and its impact on related concepts. Consider
limited partnership GAB that owns an highly-leveraged apartment
building, whose members are general partner G and limited part-
ners A and B. Assume that the partnership agreement initially
provides four different ratios-one contribution ratio and three
allocation ratios:
Initial Proceeds of
Capital Refinancing Taxable Income
Contribution Net Cash Flow or Sale or Loss
G 0% 50% 60% 10%
A 50 25 20 45
B 50 25 20 45
Assume that the partners adhere to this allocation arrangement
during years one through four and then deviate from it in year
five as follows: (1) the entire partnership depreciation deduction
for year five is allocated to B and taxable income or loss, com-
puted without regard to depreciation, is allocated according to
the original taxable income or loss ratio; (2) in year five, B
was in need of deductions whereas G and A were not because
they experienced surplus losses from other sources; and (3) the
allocation had no substantial economic effect because it, like
the special allocation of depreciation in Orrisch, had no effect
on any of the non-tax arrangements of the partners. How does
the new reallocation mechanism apply to reallocate the depre-
ciation in year five?
Each of the partnership's four ratios could be considered to reflect
some dimension of a "partner's interest in the partnership." Con-
sider first the factors the Senate Report states should be taken
into account:
(1) the interests of respective partners in profits and
losses (if different from that of taxable income or
loss),
(2) cash flow;
(3) their rights to distributions of capital upon liqui-
dation.
Does the fact that capital contribution is not one of the factors
listed suggest that the partners' contribution ratio is not to be
considered in the determination of a "partner's interest in the
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partnership?" The Senate Report is subject to interpretation on
this point, because its language is illustrative rather than exclusive.
However, it is noteworthy that it does define the "partner's interest
in the partnership" solely in terms of measures of what the
partners pull out of the partnership and not in terms of what
they put in. As suggested above, this seems to be the appro-
priate approach, particularly when dealing with the deduction for
depreciation.
Consider, then, which of the other ratios should control, whether
some sort of weighted average of the ratios should control, or whether
additional factors should also be considered. Note first that there
is nothing to suggest that the depreciation should be returned to
the partnership's bottom-line only to be reallocated according to
the partners' ratio for sharing taxable income or loss. Indeed,
if the 1976 Act does anything, it makes clear that the allocation
of taxable income or loss used in the hypothetical in years one
through four may also be disregarded because it is as subject to
the substantial economic effect requirement as is the naked allocation
of depreciation in year five. If the thesis of this paper is correct,
the disregarded allocation of depreciation will be reallocated in
accordance with one or more of the meaningful measures of antici-
pated cash benefits, which will vary from partnership to partnership.
For example, if net cash flow is the only meaningful measure of
anticipated cash benefits, other allocation ratios need not be con-
sidered in making the reallocation. To the extent the Service
identifies the application of the reallocation mechanism, it will
be establishing norms against which proposed allocations can be
evaluated.
The Regulations that clarify how the substantial economic effect
requirement and new reallocation mechanism apply to various
allocation arrangements should be coordinated with the Regulations
under the new rule that prohibits partners from increasing their
bases by nonrecourse liabilities. Real estate partnerships are ex-
cepted from this rule, and an important unanswered question is
whether limited partners in real estate partnerships will continue
to share in nonrecourse liabilities in the same proportion they
share in "profits." If the answer is yes, Regulations should clarify
what constitutes a profits interest in different situations. The
legislative history of the reallocation mechanism makes clear that a
partner's profits interest is a flexible concept that, for example,
may be different from his interest in taxable income and different
from his interest in net cash flow.
IV. Conclusion
There is an urgent need for Regulations that clarify the meaning
and importance of several concepts central to the law of partnership
taxation. The need is caused by the interrelationships of two
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basic realities of current use of the partnership form. First, it is
extremely common for partnerships to have several ratios for
sharing the different dimensions of partnership assets and activi-
ties. This is true of partnerships in numerous industries and
activities, and of partnerships of all sizes. Second, it is extremely
common for partners to attempt to allocate tax benefits and burdens
differently than they allocate cash benefits and burdens. This tends
to be and will continue to be particularly true of real estate partner-
ships, which survive relatively unscathed as a viable tax shelter. De-
preciation deductions and the tax losses they produce are viewed as
commodities to be bartered among partners, as are the deductions
stemming from particular cash expenditures, whether the partnership
be a nationwide public syndication or a handful of local businessmen.
However large or small the cast of characters, it almost invariably
consists of investors in need of tax losses who combine with promoters
or investors who have little or no need for tax losses or who, indeed,
because of surplus losses from other sources,, are in a position to "eat"
the taxable income of high-bracket investors willing to affiliate them-
selves as general or limited partners.
Most basically, Regulations should explain when tax benefits can
be allocated in accordance with what partners contribute to a part-
nership and when tax benefits must be allocated in accordance with
the partners' meaningful measure for sharing the anticipated cash
benefits of partnership assets and activities. The new Regulations
should inform attorneys and accountants, who have scant authority
to guide them, when, if ever, it is appropriate to allocate depre-
ciation deductions, or the bottom-line losses that result, on the
basis of capital contribution or liability exposure rather than in
accordance with one or all of the ratios for sharing anticipated
cash benefits. Similarly, the new "at risk" rules, together with the
new rule that prohibits partners in other than real estate partner-
ships from increasing their bases by nonrecourse liabilities, will
require new Regulations concerning the manner in which partners
share in liabilities for basis purposes. If limited partners in real
estate partnerships will continue to share in nonrecourse liabilities
in the same proportion as they share in "profits," the identity
of the profits interest in various situations must be clarified.
Finally, guidance should be given about the extent to which partners
may trace their capital contributions to soft money expenditures
and claim the corresponding deductions.
The fundamental thesis of this paper is that the basic content
of the new reallocation mechanism, which should be viewed as the
general norm for allocations, and the basic content of the profits
concept are the same: the meaningful measure of anticipated cash
benefits of the partnership in question. This approach is particularly
appropriate when the issue is the allocation of depreciation deduc-
tions or the bottom-line losses they create. A different approach is
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appropriate, however, when certain partners are allocated the deduc-
tions for actual cash expenditures they alone shoulder. In general,
soft money allocations are appropriate when the burden is traced
to particular partners because of normal business considerations
but inappropriate when traced because of an attempt by partners
to allocate among themselves the deductions, credits, or increase
in bases that most comport with their individual tax pictures.
